Loop Invariants. If b = qa + r , then the following statements are true:
the common divisors of a and b are exactly the common divisors of a and r ; 2. the subgroup of the integers generated by a and b is equal to the subgroup generated by a and r .
Applying the theorem each time we go through the loop in the algorithm, we see that the set of common divisors of a and b is a loop invariant: it is the same after completing the three steps as it was before. Thus, when we exit the algorithm, which happens when a divides b, we are guaranteed that the greatest common divisor is returned because, if a divides b, then a is the greatest common divisor of a and b. Euclid first proves that the output of the algorithm is a common divisor of a and b, and then, in order to prove that it is the greatest common divisor, he shows that any other common divisor has to divide it, so has to be smaller. This is the algebraic gcd property that Euclid notes in the porism. The algebraic gcd property is the theoretical fact that is revealed by an analysis of the Euclidean algorithm. An efficient algorithm to compute the greatest common divisor cuts no theoretical ice. You can't prove anything interesting from it because any two numbers have a greatest common divisor simply because the set of common divisors is finite. However, the fact that any other common divisor divides the greatest common divisor is surprising and fraught with consequences. It is only through the porism that the Euclidean algorithm can play a real role in Euclid's number theory.
In light of the porism, we can replace the notion of the greatest common divisor by a purely algebraic one: an algebraic gcd of two numbers is a common divisor that is divisible by any other common divisor. There is no reason to believe a priori that any two numbers have an algebraic gcd, but this is exactly what the porism tells us.
Part 2 of the theorem tells us that the subgroup generated by a and b is a loop invariant. At the end, when a is equal to the greatest common divisor of the original a and b, it says that gcd(a, b) is in the subgroup generated by a and b, that is, we can write gcd(a, b) = sa + tb for some integers s and t. This is known as Bezout's equation. From Bezout's equation it is easy to prove Euclid's porism that any common divisor of a and b must divide gcd(a, b).
We often prove Euclid's lemma today using Bezout's equation. Suppose p is a prime that divides ab. If p doesn't divide a, then p and a have no nontrivial common divisor, so Bezout's equation says that there exist integers s and t such that
Multiplying this equation by b we get spb + tab = b, which shows that p divides b, since it divides ab.
Alternatively, the algebraic gcd property can be used to prove that if p does not divide a, then gcd( pb, ab) = b, so p divides b. As we explore how Euclid himself proves Euclid's lemma, we will watch carefully to see if he appeals to this property.
LOOKING FOR A PROOF.
We now present a slightly mythologized story of a quest for a proof of Euclid's lemma. More specifically, our story starts with the question: Does Euclid have anything interesting to tell us about how to prove Euclid's lemma?
As indicated earlier, Euclid starts Book VII with a description of the Euclidean algorithm, together with a porism stating that the greatest common divisor of two numbers is divisible by any other common divisor. 
where n divides c and m > 1. That is, c/n is an nth part of c, and u is equal to m of those nth parts. In Proposition 4, Euclid showed how to compute such numbers m and n from u and c using the Euclidean algorithm, and Heath refers to Proposition 4 in his paraphrase. Euclid now claims that u : c = v : d. This is justified by another proposition: There is a serious problem with this reasoning. We know that n divides c, because that's how we chose n, but why does n divide d, that is, why is d/n a (whole) number? It's true that the Euclidean algorithm produces relatively prime numbers m and n (although Euclid does not mention this fact), and we know that nv = md. But to conclude from these two facts that n divides d requires more than Euclid's lemma itself, and that's what we are ultimately trying to prove! This provoked Zeuthen [12, pp. 155-157] to say that Euclid's proof of his lemma is worthless, because Euclid had to assume something essentially stronger than the lemma itself in order to prove Proposition 20. Thus instead of finding an alternative proof of the fundamental theorem of arithmetic, we've found a mistake in Euclid! Wait a minute. This is Euclid we're talking about, the author of the most famous mathematics text of all time, not some undergraduate taking an introduction to number theory. While he is surely not immune to making mistakes, this one seems rather outlandish. Maybe if we dig a little deeper we'll find out that he sees things more clearly than we do. Let's go back and check on what he's doing, starting with the definition of
In our analysis thus far, we took a : b = c : d to mean a/b = c/d, the usual equality of fractions: ad = bc. That was pretty naive. Everybody else, including Zeuthen, realizes that Euclid had two very different notions of proportion, one in Book V that dealt with arbitrary magnitudes and one in Book VII that dealt with numbers. The one in Book V is the celebrated Greek theory of proportions that was developed to handle incommensurable magnitudes. This theory, which has similarities with the modern theory of real numbers, is usually associated with Eudoxus. The one in Book VII deals with numbers, which are commensurable magnitudes-in fact, they are all multiples of a fixed unit magnitude. It has often been suggested that the theory in Book VII is an earlier one, perhaps due to the Pythagoreans.
Euclid certainly doesn't mean ad = bc when he writes "a is to b as c is to d" in Book VII. He defined what we shall call Pythagorean proportionality, to distinguish it from the Eudoxean proportionality of Book V. We use the adjective "Pythagorean" to indicate that this proportionality deals with whole numbers only. Here is Euclid's definition in modern form. Notice that this can be thought of as saying that the fractions a/b and c/d have a common cancellation, namely, m/n. Clearly this implies that ad = bc (equality of fractions). The converse, although it is true for natural numbers, is much deeper and fails in other multiplicative settings where unique factorization into primes does not obtain (see Examples 1 and 2). Observe also that Pythagorean proportionality simply says that a is m nth parts of b and that c is the same parts of d. This is pretty much how Euclid actually phrased it.
Definition 20 (Pythagorean Proportionality
The equivalence of Pythagorean proportionality and equality of fractions is needed in Euclid Euclid didn't prove alternando in this way because he viewed the numbers a, b, c, d, x, and y as magnitudes, albeit all multiples of the same unit, while m and n were things that answered the question: How many? Thus the number x is a part of the number a, and m tells us how many xs it takes to make a. Objects like m and n have been referred to in the modern literature as "repetition numbers" by Fowler [4] and "scalars" by Bashmakova [1] . Fowler calls the ordinary numbers "cardinal numbers." Indeed, for a modern student it might help in understanding this distinction to think of numbers as represented by finite sets. When we multiply a set a by a scalar m we take the union of m disjoint copies of a. When Euclid wanted to multiply two numbers a and b, he let m be the number of units in a and set ab = mb.
How, then, does Euclid prove Proposition 19, that Pythagorean proportionality is equivalent to equality of fractions? Since this proposition is all we need to complete the proof of Euclid's lemma, surely we will see an appeal to the porism here, either directly or indirectly. The interesting half of the proposition is the implication from ad = bc to a : b = c : d. Euclid's proof goes as follows. If ad = bc, then certainly ac : ad = ac : bc. On the other hand, it is immediate from the definition of Pythagorean proportionality that ac : ad = c : d (take x = ay) and ac : bc = a : b.
Amazing! No appeal whatsoever to the porism. Euclid has provided us with a proof of his lemma that, ironically, does not depend in an essential way on the algorithm that bears his name, even though he began Book VII with that algorithm and its algebraic consequences for the greatest common divisor. Can we believe that? It seems like magic. Where did the work get done?
Well, the symbolism we've adopted-using the equality sign in the notation for a proportion-is deceptive and may make it difficult for you to spot the flaw in Euclid's argument. Euclid himself said, "Things which equal the same thing also equal one another." Because we have internalized this axiom, it is dangerous to use an equality sign in a situation where transitivity does not obviously hold. Please accept our apologies. In fact, it is a nontrivial task to prove that Pythagorean proportionality is transitive. Perhaps the simplest setting where the fundamental theorem of arithmetic fails is that of our first example: Our second example is more complicated, but possibly more satisfactory because it is a system in which you can also add: Example 2. Consider the semiring S of real numbers a + b √ 2 such that a and b are nonegative integers, not both 0. Here we have
and all four factors are primes. Note that S is not the ring Z[ 
HOW TO FIX EUCLID'S ARGUMENT.
It's interesting that Euclid explicitly proves, in Proposition 11 of Book V, that Eudoxean proportionality is transitive but fails to provide a proof that Pythagorean proportionality is transitive, even though the proof of Proposition 19 makes essential use of this fact. Is there a simple argument we could incorporate into Book VII to show that Pythagorean proportionality is transitive as well?
Bashmakova [1] thought there was. She identified the unjustified use of transitivity in the proof of Proposition 19 as the problem, as opposed to Zeuthen's claim that the proof of Proposition 20 suffered from petitio principii. Then she suggested using the transitivity of Eudoxean proportionality to fix it. To that end she gave a straightforward proof, which does not invoke the porism, that Pythagorean proportionality implies Eudoxean proportionality. But if this approach worked, then we would still have a proof of Euclid's lemma that does not appeal to the porism. The problem is that Bashmakova did not prove the converse, namely, that Eudoxean proportionality for numbers implies Pythagorean proportionality. That's the part she really needed to address. Indeed, it's easy to prove, without using the porism, that Eudoxean proportionality for numbers is equivalent to equality of fractions, so Proposition 19 can be viewed as saying that Eudoxean and Pythagorean proportionality are equivalent. From this perspective, Euclid's error in the proof of Proposition 19 occurs when he is proving that Eudoxean proportionality implies Pythagorean proportionality-the other half of the proof is fine. In short, Bashmakova's fix is no fix at all. (We discovered Bashmakova's paper from a reference in Narkiewicz [8] .)
March 2006] DID EUCLID NEED THE EUCLIDEAN ALGORITHM?
Heath did not comment on Euclid's unsupported use of transitivity. However, in his notes on Eudoxean proportionality [3, vol. 2, pp. 126-9] , he gave a proof, attributed to R. Simson, that Pythagorean proportionality is the same as Eudoxean proportionality applied to whole numbers. But this proof is fatally flawed at the end, where the different definitions of part in Books V and VII are confused: in Book V a part of a magnitude is any submultiple of another magnitude, whereas in Book VII a part of a number must also be another number.
The two notions of proportionality are not so easily related, although many authors have been tempted to imagine that they are. Pythagorean proportionality is about divisibility of numbers and is tailored to studying factorization. Eudoxean proportionality, which for numbers is equivalent to equality of fractions, says nothing about factorization. That they are equivalent for numbers is essentially the content of Proposition 19.
What is the best way to fix Euclid's argument? We suggest a way that uses Euclid's porism that the greatest common divisor is an algebraic greatest common divisor, as discussed in section 2. The idea, which may also be found in [ Because x is a common divisor of a and b, and y is a common divisor of c and d, the porism says that we can find i and j such that gcd(a, b) = i x and gcd(c, d) = j y. The first thing we want to do is to show that i = j. By symmetry it suffices to show that i divides j. Now i x divides mx, so iy divides my. Similarly, i x divides nx, so iy divides ny. Thus iy divides both my = c and ny = d. From the porism we conclude that iy
What kind of proof of Euclid's lemma do we end up with? Let's review what we've done. Pythagorean proportionality is essentially a relation between fractions (not rational numbers), a priori stronger than the usual equivalence. It says that a/b is related to c/d if a/b and c/d have a common cancellation, namely, m/n with m and n as in Definition 20. (Of course, Euclid would never phrase it that way, because for him m and n are entities of a type different from a and b, as discussed after Proposition 19.) The porism to the Euclidean algorithm can be used to show that this relation is transitive via our fix, and transitivity is used to show that it is equivalent to equality of fractions ad = bc (Proposition 19). Then, because Pythagorean proportionality is equivalent to equality of fractions, we see that if we cancel a/b as much as possible, we get the smallest fraction equivalent to a/b under equality of fractions (lowest terms). That's not clear without Proposition 19: it could have been that a and b were relatively prime, yet a/b was not in lowest terms in the sense that there were smaller numbers c and d
.) The equivalence of the two conditions (i) that a and b are relatively prime and (ii) that a/b is in lowest terms lies at the heart of Euclid's proof.
To establish Euclid's lemma, we assume that p is a prime that divides ab, say ab = pc. Then a/ p = c/b, from which it follows that a/ p and c/b have a common cancellation because equality of fractions implies Pythagorean proportionality (Proposition 19). Now either p divides a and we're done, or p does not divide a, so we can't cancel a/ p because p is prime. In the latter case c/b must cancel down to a/ p (Proposition 20), implying that p divides b.
CANONICAL PARTS.
Focusing on the greatest common divisor suggests that perhaps Euclid always had canonical parts in mind when he dealt with Pythagorean proportion. (This more or less corresponds to our normally thinking of fractions as being in lowest terms.) If one required canonical parts throughout, then the transitivity needed in the proof of Proposition 19 would be trivial, scarcely worth mentioning. In fact, Zeuthen (in a later paper [13, pp. 395-435]) and Itard [5] proposed this interpretation. They believed that when Euclid showed how to construct the greatest common divisor using the Euclidean algorithm and gave its algebraic properties in the porism, Why doesn't the canonical-parts interpretation of Pythagorean proportionality solve the whole problem? Bashmakova entertained such an idea but rejected it, partly because of another of Euclid's propositions in Book VII:
This proposition, which follows easily for Pythagorean proportionality using Euclid's proof, requires substantial additional argument to prove under the canonical parts interpretation. Itard [5] points out this problem. Although it is not apparent from our presentation, Proposition 6 is essential for Euclid's development of the proof of his lemma. The proof we gave for Proposition 13 (alternando) is not Euclid's, and while it works for Pythagorean proportionality, it is inadequate under the canonical parts interpretation. Euclid's quite different proof of alternando, which is valid under both interpretations (as are most of his propositions), relies on Proposition 6.
Moreover, alternando is required at a key step in the proof of Proposition 19 under the canonical parts interpretation: the step where one observes that ac : ad = c : d. = gcd(a + c, b + d) . This follows from our fix, so that theorem also serves to repair Euclid's proof of his lemma under the canonical parts interpretation.
Thus the overall picture of Euclid's arguments leading to the proof of his lemma is as follows. The proof of Proposition 19 is not valid for Pythagorean proportionality, while the proof of Proposition 6 is not valid under the canonical parts interpretation. Our fix, which relies on the porism, establishes that the two interpretations are equivalent, thereby salvaging Euclid's line of reasoning under either interpretation. These two interpretations, and our fix, were spelled out by Taisbak in [10] .
CONCLUSION.
In an attempt to discover how Euclid proved the key lemma for the fundamental theorem of arithmetic, we ran into the question of whether Euclid used, or needed to use, the Euclidean algorithm in an essential way. As written, his proof makes no essential appeal to the algorithm. On the other hand, in his proof of Proposition 19, which asserts that Pythagorean proportionality is equivalent to equality of fractions (and thus to Eudoxean proportionality), Euclid unjustifiably assumes that Pythagorean proportionality is transitive. This gap can be filled with an argument that uses the porism to the Euclidean algorithm, and it seems reasonable that Euclid could and should have supplied such an argument. The fact that Pythagorean proportionality follows from equality of fractions has been called the Vierzahlensatz. This theorem is proved and elaborated upon by Surányi [9] , who claims that it had been noted by Euler.
Transitivity of Pythagorean proportionality has been spotlighted by our investigation. Its significance is put into perspective by its connection with two other multiplicative properties: the existence of algebraic gcds and the uniqueness of prime factorization. In a cancellative commutative monoid with the divisor chain condition, these three properties are equivalent. For the natural numbers other completely different approaches to Euclid's lemma and unique factorization are available. One can use induction, or the geometric approach of Surányi [9] .
Several modern commentators have overlooked the transitivity gap in Euclid's proof of Proposition 19, or the gap in Proposition 6 under the canonical parts alternative [2] , [3] , [6] , [7] , [11] , [13] . Some have been deceived into thinking that Pythagorean proportionality is easily proved to be a special case of Eudoxean proportionality [1] , [3] , [6] without appealing to the porism to the Euclidean algorithm. In fact, Pythagorean proportionality is a priori more stringent than Eudoxean proportionality applied to numbers, as our two examples in other multiplicative settings show. For the natural numbers, Pythagorean and Eudoxean proportionality are equivalent, but establishing this fact is nontrivial.
How could Euclid have left such a large gap? When he defined Eudoxean proportionality for magnitudes, he proved that it was transitive (Proposition 11 of Book V). In Book VII he defined Pythagorean proportionality in a completely different way, but assumed without proof that it, too, was transitive. While the transitivity is not obvious, he could have obtained it from the porism with which he began Book VII. It remains extraordinarily perplexing that Euclid stated the porism, but failed to use it where he most needed it.
Finally, the common view today is that Eudoxean proportionality is a sophisticated idea that subsumed the simpler Pythagorean proportionality and made it obsolete. Our analysis indicates that, on the contrary, Pythagorean proportionality is not an immediate special case of Eudoxean proportionality. It is a priori a strictly stronger relation, especially suited for studying divisibility.
